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Abstract. In March 2011, the European Commission launched a proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). However, a Common Corporate Tax Base 
(CCTB), leaving consolidation and apportionment out of consideration, appears to be a 
more realistic proposition for corporate tax harmonization in Europe. Using the European 
Tax Analyzer (ETA), we simulate the impact of the CCTB on the effective tax burden in 
Belgium. The results show that the adoption of the CCTB increases the Belgian effective 
tax burden by 16%. This remarkable increase is mainly driven by the fact that national 
tax deductions are not allowed under CCTB. This study allows policymakers to gain in-
sight into the size effects of certain corporate tax measures and contributes to the current 
discussion on corporate tax harmonization in Europe.
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Introduction
In March 2011, the European Commission (EC) launched a proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (EC 2011). The goal of this optional tax 
system is to remove the underlying causes of all tax obstacles currently harming the 
international competitiveness of European multinationals (EC 2001). The tax liability 
of a company belonging to a CCCTB group would be determined by applying four 
distinct steps. Firstly, each group member has to calculate its taxable profit according 
to the same set of rules, i.e. the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB). Secondly, the 
individual tax bases are summed up to the consolidated tax base while taking into ac-
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count the elimination of intra-group transactions and loss compensation. Thirdly, the 
consolidated tax base is allocated to the different group members by means of an ap-
portionment formula. Finally, each member state has the right to apply its own tax rate 
to the specific share of the overall tax base (Schön et al. 2008). 
Recent studies (Bettendorf et al. 2010) exploring the macro-economic impact of in-
troducing a CCCTB find that the system would not yield substantial welfare gains for 
Europe. The variation of welfare effects across countries is large and highly depends on 
the design of the apportionment formula. A less-far reaching and therefore more achiev-
able approach would be the introduction of a CCTB. This policy option would affect 
the calculation of the corporate tax base by introducing a common set of tax account-
ing rules for all member states. At a later stage, consolidation and apportionment of 
the individual tax bases could be included, which transforms the CCTB into a CCCTB 
system. As some member states have clearly expressed scepticism about the feasibility 
of CCCTB, the CCTB approach appears to be a more realistic proposition for corporate 
tax harmonization in Europe (Oestreicher et al. 2009). In this respect, also the French-
German intention to introduce a harmonized tax system could have an impact on the 
implementation of a CCTB in Europe1. 
Using the European Tax Analyzer (ETA), Spengel et al. (2012) simulate the impact 
of a CCTB on the effective tax burden of companies in all 27 EU member states. The 
results show that the effective tax burden would, on an EU average, remain largely 
unchanged (–0.06%).
One of the great merits of the study of Spengel et al. (2012) is that the effective tax 
burden effect is measured for each of the EU member states. Moreover, this large-scale 
approach gives the opportunity to assess the effective tax burden for Europe as a whole. 
However, such an approach is very time-consuming and a limitation of this study is that 
it is unfeasible to address all national tax regulations in great detail. Also, the study of 
Spengel et al. (2012) explains the most important differences between the losing and 
winning countries and does not have the intention to stress the tax burden effect for 
one country in particular.
Our research contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, contrary to the 
previous literature, we focus on the impact of a CCTB on the effective tax burden for 
Belgian companies in particular. Specifically, we compare the effective tax burden under 
CCTB with the tax burden under the Belgian tax system and investigate the isolated 
impact of the implemented tax measures. In order to do this, we extent the latest ver-
sion of the ETA taking into account the Belgian tax measures stimulating R&D. We 
also implement particular measures for SMEs like the increased percentage for notional 
interest deduction and the reduced tax rates. As regards CCTB, we apply all rules as 
recently proposed by the EC (EC 2011). These rules, for example, deal with assump-
tions concerning depreciation and valuation of inventories. Second, we contribute to the 
1 In a letter to European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, German Chancellor Merkel and 
the former French President Sarkozy revealed their intention to introduce a common corporate tax 
base and tax rate in 2013 (Paris, 16th August, 2011). 
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existing literature by studying under which conditions the CCTB could be an attractive 
choice for Belgian companies and by including policy recommendations that could be 
relevant for other European countries.
In general, the results show that the adoption of the proposed CCTB remarkably in-
creases the tax burden by 16%. This finding is mainly driven by the fact that Belgian 
companies are not allowed to apply the notional interest deduction under CCTB.
1. Recent reforms of corporate taxation
In Belgium, an important corporate tax reform was introduced in 2003 when the nomi-
nal tax rate was reduced from 40.17% to 33.99% (Valenduc 2004). One of the scarce 
studies in Belgium concerning corporate tax reforms is that of Vandenbussche et al. 
(2005). The authors show that the effective tax rate for large Belgian companies steadily 
increased over the period 1993–2002. They also argue that the government anticipated 
the large reduction in the statutory tax rate in 2003 by widening the tax base in the years 
just before that reduction.
In spite of the important decrease of the nominal tax rate in 2003, additional reforms 
were introduced in the following years with the aim to spur investment and promote 
R&D. For example, the deduction for patent income and the deduction or tax credit 
for investments improving the environment were introduced in tax year 2007. Another 
remarkable measure in Belgium was the introduction of the allowance for corporate 
equity (ACE) in tax year 2006, i.e. the so-called notional interest deduction (NID). 
This measure allows companies to deduct from their taxable profits a fictious interest 
calculated on the basis of their corporate equity and tackles the fiscal discrimination 
between equity and debt financing (Valenduc 2004). For a sample of Belgian SMEs, 
Kestens et al. (2012) find that the adoption of the NID declined the marginal tax rates 
from 29% to 2.9%.
Corporate tax reforms were not only introduced at the national level, but also at the 
European level. In October 2001, the European Commission (EC) published the report 
‘Company Taxation in the Internal market’ (EC 2001) in which the main tax obstacles 
for companies were described. By tackling all these obstacles, the Commission believes 
that CCCTB would be the best comprehensive solution to stimulate the international 
competitiveness of European multinationals (EC 2001). Eventually, in March 2011 the 
EC launched a proposal for a Council directive on a CCCTB (EC 2011). 
Oestreicher and Koch (2011) assess the revenue consequences of using a CCCTB in 
the EU member states. Their results reveal that total tax revenue would be reduced by 
4.56% when CCCTB would be compulsory and by 4.65% when CCCTB would be 
optional.
Other studies explore the macro-economic consequences of the proposed EU reforms 
for a CCCTB. Using a numerical computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for 
Europe, Bettendorf et al. (2010) suggest that on an EU-average neither a common tax 
base nor a consolidation with formula apportionment would yield substantial welfare 
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gains. However, the variation of effects across countries is large and highly depends on 
the choice of the apportionment formula. As the published EC documents lack clarity 
about the technical details of consolidation and apportionment, some authors have stick 
to the system of a CCTB (Spengel et al. 2012). Haverals (2007) relies on the preparing 
documents of the EC and uses IAS/IFRS as a starting point for the development of a 
CCTB. The study shows that the application of IAS/IFRS in Belgium would broaden 
the tax burdens of companies by 3.8–14.6% depending on their sector. Using the ETA, 
Spengel et al. (2012) study the impact of a CCTB in Europe. However, in this study 
CCTB is applied according to the proposal which defines CCTB as a common set of 
autonomous tax accounting rules without explicit reference to IAS/IFRS. Their results 
show that the differences between the proposed CCTB and national accounting rules 
have a small impact on the tax burden. Only five countries have positive or negative 
changes above 2%.
2. Research set-up and methodology
In this paper, we focus on the impact of a CCTB on the effective tax burden for Bel-
gian companies in particular and examine the following research questions:
– To what extent does the effective tax burden for an average company differ when 
applying CCTB instead of the Belgian tax system?
– What is the size of the impact on the tax burden when the implemented tax rules 
of CCTB and the Belgian system are considered in isolation?
– How could CCTB be an attractive choice for Belgian companies if the system 
would be optional?
To answer these research questions, we use the ETA (Spengel, Oestreicher 2012) de-
veloped by the Centre for European Economic Research and the University of Man-
nheim. It is the first micro-simulation model which measures the average tax burden2 
taking into account a detailed assessment of all major elements forming the corporate 
tax base. For example, the model takes into account depreciation rules and thin capi-
talization rules. Thus, the ETA goes beyond prior approaches3 by setting up an explicit 
link between financial accounting and tax accounting. The ETA (Spengel, Oestreicher 
2012) calculates and compares effective average tax burdens for companies located in 
one of the EU-27 member states. The absolute effective average tax burden is derived 
from simulating the development of a company over a 10 year period and is defined as 
the difference between the pre-tax value and the post-tax value of the firm at the end 
of the simulation period. 
In the first step, the pre-tax value of the firm in period 10 is determined. This equals 
the sum of the estimated pre-tax cash flows and the value of net assets at the end of 
the simulation period. The pre-tax cash flows are based on estimates for cash receipts 
2 For a discussion about measuring the average versus marginal tax burden we refer to Fullerton 
(1984) and Devereux and Griffith (2003).
3 See Schanz and Schanz (2010) and Finke et al. (forthcoming) for a discussion on existing corporate 
micro-simulation models.
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and cash expenses in each period. The value of net assets in period 10 is calculated by 
deducting the liabilities of the corporation from the assets. In the second step, the post-
tax value of the firm at the end of the simulation period is calculated. The determination 
of the post-tax value of the firm only has cash flow effects and no impact on the value 
of the net assets. So, the post-tax value is expressed as the pre-tax value of the firm 
minus the cash flows due to tax liabilities in each period and minus the cash flows for 
possible hidden reserves and liabilities at the end of the simulation period. In order to 
determine the absolute amount of tax liabilities in each period, receipts and expenses 
are entered into the balance sheet and/or into the tax profit and loss account following 
national taxation rules or CCTB rules. After having applied the national tax rates, other 
relevant components such as tax credits are taken into account to calculate the amount 
of tax liabilities. The impact in percentage of the different elements of CCTB on the 
tax burden can be written as follows: 
Impact tax burden (%) = 
( ) ( )
( )
 ,  ,  
 ,  
            
  
     
pretax post tax CCTB pretax post tax NAT GAAP
pretax post tax NAT GAAP







The ETA uses empirical data, mainly taken from the Amadeus database to form one 
large and one small or medium-sized (SME) EU-27 average company4. Publicly owned 
companies and companies with a legal form (e.g. partnerships) or industry (e.g. mining) 
that are not relevant are left out. Additionally, companies for which the required data 
are not available are excluded (Spengel, Oestreicher 2012). 
3. Description of the Belgian tax system  
and the Common Corporate Tax Base
3.1. The Belgian tax system
In accordance with Belgian corporate tax law, the distributed as well as the retained 
profits are subject to income tax. These taxable profits result from the costs and rev-
enues mentioned in the profit and loss account. The profit before tax will be subject to 
several adjustments in order to obtain the taxable income. In what follows, we consider 
the main tax adjustments taken into account in the ETA5. 
– Applying the Belgian tax code, assets have to be depreciated individually over 
their useful lives (pooling is not allowed). Straight line depreciation is obliged for 
intangible fixed assets. In the ETA, intangibles are depreciated at a rate of 20%6. 
For tangible fixed assets, double declining balance or straight line depreciation is 
allowed. In the ETA, the most favourable option from a tax perspective is applied. 
4 For the balance sheets and financial ratios of the large company and SME at the end of year 6, we 
refer to Spengel and Oestreicher (2012: 15–16).
5 For a complete overview of the Belgian tax rules and all its conditions we refer to the Belgian 
Income tax code of 1992.
6 In the ETA intangibles only consist of patents and licenses.
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For buildings, straight line depreciation is used. Office buildings are depreciated at 
a depreciation rate of 3%, while factory buildings are depreciated at 5%. For ma-
chinery, factory and office equipment, the double declining balance method is used.
– The depreciation base comprises any costs connected with the construction of a 
fixed asset. In the ETA, only direct costs are included in the depreciation base. In 
Belgium, cost of R&D can be only capitalized under certain conditions. For reasons 
of simplicity, R&D costs are directly expensed in the ETA.
– Different valuation methods for inventories are allowed in Belgium: The LIFO 
method is used in the ETA, being the most favourable one from a tax perspective.
– Interest expenses are deductible from the taxable basis. However, a 7:1 debt/equity 
ratio applies if the creditor is exempt or taxed at a reduced rate in respect of the 
interest paid on the debt. Interests related to debt in excess of this ratio are con-
sidered as non-deductible business expenses. Due to computational limitations, the 
simulations with ETA take into account a 1:1 debt/equity ratio.
– Interests and royalty payments derived from a non-resident company are subject to 
corporate income tax. To avoid double taxation, a credit method is applied for the 
withholding taxes paid and for the taxes paid abroad. 
In addition to these adjustments, some specific tax deductions are allowed in the Belgian 
tax system. However, these deductions need to be applied in a fixed order and cannot 
lead to a fiscal loss. In what follows, we explain the deductions applied in the ETA in 
more detail:
– In order to avoid double taxation, the Belgian tax legislator introduced an exemp-
tion for domestic and foreign dividend income, also called the participation exemp-
tion (PE). First, the gross dividends received from subsidiaries are included in the 
taxable base of the parent company. Second, 95% of the amount of dividends is 
deducted from the taxable base. In case of insufficient taxable profit, the unused 
PE can be carried forward indefinitely.
– Since assessment year 2007, companies are allowed to deduct from their taxable 
profits a fictitious interest rate calculated on the basis of their corrected equity, i.e. 
the NID. With this ACE, the tax authority wants to eliminate the fiscal discrimina-
tion between financing through debt and financing through own resources. Each tax 
year, the NID rate is determined on the basis of the average rate for Belgian 10-year 
linear treasury bonds. For companies recognized as SME, this rate is increased by 
0.5%. In order to get rational simulation results, the percentage for NID is in line 
with the long term debt assumption made in the ETA, namely 5.1%. The unused 
NID can be carried forward for seven years.
– In order to create an attractive investment climate, the Belgian tax legislation allows 
for a deduction on innovative investments or investments improving the environ-
ment. The investment deduction reduces the taxable basis with a certain percentage 
of the depreciation base7. Due to model restrictions in the ETA, we only apply an 
investment deduction for patents, which is calculated as 13.5% of the depreciation 
7 For certain investments, the deduction can be spread in time. See the Belgian Corporate Income 
Tax Code 1992 for more details.
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base. The unused investment deduction can be carried forward indefinitely. Impor-
tant to mention is that companies can also choose for a patent tax credit instead 
of an investment deduction. This tax credit equals 33.99% of the amount of the 
investment deduction. The tax credit is non-refundable, but can be carried forward 
for four years. After this period, the unused balance can be refunded the year after.
The applied tax rate equals 33.99%, including a crisis surtax of 3%. Also reduced tax 
rates can be applied when the taxable profit does not exceed €322,5008.
3.2. The Common Corporate Tax Base
According to the EC proposal, no specific tax deductions are provided for in the CCTB. 
Concerning the simulations with ETA, we take into account the following tax rules:
– A distinction is made between long-life fixed assets with a useful life longer than 
or equal to 15 years and short to medium life fixed assets, with a useful life less 
than 15 years. Long-life fixed assets are depreciated individually on a straight-line 
base over their useful lives. For buildings, the depreciation rate equals 2.5%. Other 
long-life tangible assets are depreciated at a rate of 6.67%. Intangible assets are 
depreciated over the period for which the assets enjoy legal protection or for which 
the right is granted. If this period cannot be determined, the depreciation rate equals 
6.67%. Short to medium life fixed assets are depreciated together in one asset pool 
at an annual rate of 25% of the depreciation base. 
– The depreciation base comprises any direct costs connected with the construction 
of a fixed asset. All research and development costs are deductible expenses.
– Concerning the valuation of inventories, we apply the WAC in the ETA, being the 
most favourable one.
– In order to avoid double taxation, domestic and foreign dividend income are ex-
empt for 95%.
– Income from interests and royalties are taxable, with a tax credit for withholding 
taxes paid.
– Interest expenses are generally deductible from the tax base. However, there is 
no deduction allowed for interests paid to associated companies resident for tax 
purposes in a low-tax country outside the EU, which does not exchange informa-
tion. Because of technical matters, the ETA takes into account a 1:1 debt/equity 
ratio as TCR.
4. Results
4.1. Belgian tax system
The base case figure in Table 1 represents the Belgian tax burden for a large company 
8 However, some corporations are excluded from the reduced tax rates. Concerning these conditions, 
we refer to the Belgian Corporate Income Tax Code of 1992. The SME firm in ETA meets all cri-
teria to apply the reduced tax rates (e.g. taxable income = 131 000).
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resulting from simulations using the previous version of the ETA9. In what follows, 
we give depth to the Belgian corporate tax system by implementing the NID and the 
investment deduction or tax credit for patents. Applying these tax measures, we can a 
priori expect a decrease of the Belgian tax burden. The results in Table 1 reveal the 
size of this decline. The implementation of the tax measures mentioned above reduces 
the Belgian tax burden by 12.57%. When looking at the isolated effects of the different 
measures, the results indicate that the decrease is mainly caused by the NID. This tax 
incentive leads to a reduction of 12.07%. With respect to patents, Belgian companies 
have to choose between investment deduction or tax credit. As our large model firm is 
profitable, the impact of both alternatives is the same (–0.50%). 
Table 1. Effective tax burden and impact of particular tax categories Belgian tax system,  
large company (fiscal year 2011)
  Tax burden Impact
Base case Belgian Tax System 35,152,405
Belgian Tax System: all options 30,732,669 –12.57%
Impact Option Notional Interest Deduction 30,909,699 –12.07%
Investment Deduction Patent 34,975,375 –0.50%
 Tax Credit Patent 34,975,376 –0.50%
Table 2. Effective tax burden and impact of particular tax categories Belgian tax system,  
SME (fiscal year 2011)
  Tax burden Impact
Base case Belgian Tax System 1,230,717
Belgian Tax System: all options 1,094,071 –11.10%
Impact Option Notional Interest Deduction 1,098,811 –10.72%
Investment Deduction Patent 1,226,081 –0.38%
 Tax Credit Patent 1,225,977 –0.39%
We carry out the same simulations for a SME, taking into account the reduced corporate 
tax rates and the higher notional interest percentage. The results of these simulations 
are presented in Table 2. Comparing these results with those of a large company, the 
decrease is again mainly driven by the NID. However, despite the higher notional inter-
est percentage for SMEs (+0.5%), the caused decline in tax burden is smaller compared 
9 The previous version of the ETA calculates the Belgian tax burden without taking into account the 
NID and the investment deduction or tax credit for patents. We consider the Belgian tax burden 
under the previous version as our ‘base case’ result.
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with large companies (–10.72% instead of –12.07%). This result is due to the fact that 
the average SME model disposes of a lower equity ratio than the average large com-
pany, which implies that the NID can be less exploited. Therefore, it could be suggested 
that SMEs may claim a higher notional interest to obtain decreases in tax burden that 
are similar to large companies. The results further indicate that the patent deduction for 
SMEs decreases the tax burden by 0.38% instead of 0.50% for large companies. This 
can be explained by the lower investment activities of the SME model. Moreover, we 
can remark that when SMEs choose for the tax credit this turns out to be more favour-
able (–0.39%) than choosing for investment deduction (-0.38%). This is caused by the 
fact that in case of an investment deduction, the reduced tax rates are applied whereas 
in case of a tax credit, the higher standard tax rate is used.
4.2. Common Corporate Tax Base
The changes of the effective tax burden induced by the adoption of the proposed CCTB 
regulations are displayed in Table 3 and Table 4, for a large company and SME respec-
tively. It is assumed that the rules described in section 4 are implemented simultane-
ously. Since there is no intention to extend harmonization to corporate income tax rates, 
CCTB applies the Belgian tax rates. 
Table 3. Changes in effective tax burden by adoption of CCTB and isolated impact of  
specific regulations, large company (fiscal year 2011)
  Tax burden Impact
Belgian Tax System: all options 30,732,669
CCTB: all options 35,556,551 15.70%
 
Base case Belgian Tax System 35,152,405
CCTB: all options 35,556,551 1.15%




 Valuation inventory 35,241,597 0.25%
The results in Table 3 reveal an increased tax burden when CCTB would be valid. 
Particularly, CCTB increases the Belgian tax burden by 15.70%. This difference can 
be explained by the fact that under CCTB specific national tax incentives (deductions 
or tax credits) are not allowed. However, when we start from the base case, leaving the 
Belgian incentives out of consideration, CCTB would only increase the tax burden to 
a small extent (1.15%). When looking at the isolated effects, the results indicate that 
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the increase is mainly caused by the differences in depreciation rules. With respect 
to buildings, the Belgian as well as the CCTB system apply the straight line method. 
CCTB sets the useful life for buildings to 40 years, regardless of the type of building. 
Contrary, Belgium prescribes a useful life for office buildings of 33 years and allows 
a shorter depreciation period of 20 years for industrial buildings. Thus, the adoption 
of the common depreciation rules for buildings, which are more restrictive, causes an 
increase in the effective tax burden of 0.14%. Concerning machinery and equipment, 
the double declining method is used for Belgium. The results indicate that this leads to 
a smaller tax burden than the one reflected by the standard depreciation rate of 25% for 
asset pools under the proposed CCTB (0.38% for machinery and 0.37% for equipment). 
The last row of Table 3 shows the impact of the valuation of inventory. For CCTB the 
weighted-average-cost (WAC) method is chosen as an option, while for Belgium the 
LIFO method is applied. Assuming rising prices, the LIFO method leads to higher ex-
penditures and results in a lower tax burden compared with the WAC method (0.25%). 
Table 4 presents the tax burden for a SME under both the Belgian and CCTB system. 
Comparing these results with those of a large company, CCTB increases the Belgian 
tax burden to a comparable, but somewhat lesser degree (14.18%).
4.3. Sensitivity analysis: economic model assumptions
As a robustness check we determine how changes in economic model assumptions influ-
ence the effect of a simultaneous introduction of all CCTB options.10 More specific, the 
effects of the changes in the firm’s capital intensity, profitability and capital structure 
are simulated and reported in Table 5. 
To measure the impact of the model firm’s capital intensity on the tax burden in case 
of a CCTB, the share of tangible assets to total assets is raised (or lowered) by 5%, 
10 As benchmark case we consider the tax burden under the Belgian tax system taking into account 
the NID. We do not take into consideration the investment deduction or tax credit for patents as 
their impact is small.
Table 4. Changes in effective tax burden by adoption of CCTB and isolated impact of  
specific regulations, SME (fiscal year 2011)
  Tax burden Impact
Belgian Tax System: all options 1,094,071
CCTB: all options 1,249,231 14.18%
 
Base case Belgian Tax System 1,230,717
CCTB: all options 1,249,231 1.50%
Impact CCTB Option Depreciation 1,244,601 1.13%
 Valuation inventory 1,235,177 0.36%
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10% and 15% with respect to the benchmark case. In return, long term receivables are 
reduced (or increased) accordingly to leave the sum of all assets unchanged. In general, 
the results show that the tax burden under both systems decreases as the capital intensity 
becomes higher, i.e. more depreciation costs are deducted from the tax base. Comparing 
CCTB with the Belgian tax system, the tax burden according to the Belgian tax rules 
decreases faster due to its more favourable depreciation methods. 
Apart from capital intensity, profitability is another factor that influences the tax burden. 
To measure this impact, the return on sales ratio is modified by changing sales revenues 
and keeping expenses stable. Increases and decreases of 10%, 20% and 30% are con-
sidered. The results in Table 5 show that the tax burden under both systems increases 
as sales revenues rise. As expenses like the NID are kept fixed, the tax burden under 
the Belgian tax system increases faster as this measure becomes less influential with 
growing profit.
The final analysis deals with the capital structure, i.e. the equity/debt ratio. This ratio is 
lowered or increased by 10%, 20% and 30%. When the equity ratio is higher than the 
benchmark case, the tax burden increases under both systems as less interests are de-
ductible. In front of that, an equity ratio that is lower than the base case should decrease 
the tax burden as more interests accrue. The results, however, show that from a certain 
amount of debt, the tax burden increases under both systems. This can be explained by 
the working of the thin capitalization rule that restricts the deduction of interest to a 
debt/equity ratio of 1:1. For the Belgian system, lowering the equity ratio even causes a 
bigger increase because of a twofold effect: on the one hand, the thin cap rule applies, 
on the other hand, the benefit of the NID becomes smaller.
Conclusions
As the published proposal for a CCCTB lacks clarity about the technical details of con-
solidation and apportionment, a CCTB would be the most achievable option in the short 
term. In a recent study, Spengel et al. (2012) use the ETA to simulate the impact of a 
CCTB on the effective tax burden of companies in the 27 EU member states. However, 
given the large scale of their study, it is unfeasible to address all national tax regulations 
in great detail. To fill this gap in the literature, we focus on the impact of CCTB on the 
effective tax burden for Belgian companies in particular.
The results show that the introduction of CCTB would broaden the Belgian tax base 
and lead to an increase of the tax burden by 15.70%. This increase can be mainly ex-
plained by the fact that under CCTB specific national tax incentives like the NID are 
not allowed. Furthermore, CCTB applies less favourable depreciation and inventory 
valuation methods. As a robustness check, we look how changes in economic model 
assumptions influence the tax burden. Under both tax systems, increasing profitability 
and equity leads to a higher tax burden, whereas an increasing capital intensity leads 
to a lower tax burden. When comparing the CCTB with the Belgian tax system, the 
biggest differences in increase or decrease occur when the company is characterized by 
low profitability, high capital intensity and high equity.
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If CCTB would be introduced as an optional tax system, Belgian companies will only 
choose for the new tax system if, at least, it does not increase their current tax burden 
in the short-term. In this respect, we could make some policy recommendations. Given 
the base broadening under CCTB, Belgian policymakers could reduce the corporate in-
come tax rate without changing the tax income. As the statutory tax rate is an important 
determinant of location decisions (Devereux et al. 2002), this could increase the attrac-
tiveness of Belgium for multinational investors. Another option Belgian policymakers 
could consider, is to convince Europe that the NID should be allowed under CCTB. 
This seems a feasible option, given the fact that other EU countries like Italy and Latvia 
already have experiences with a form of ACE (Parillo 2012). For example, Italy allows 
domestic companies and Italian braches of foreign companies to apply a tax deduction 
computed as 3% of the equity formed after 2010 (Panteghini et al. 2012). Notwithstand-
ing our contribution to the current literature, we have to deal with some shortcomings 
of our study. While our analysis focuses on the effective tax burden effects of a CCTB, 
our simulations do not capture all possible elements determining the desirability of such 
harmonization. Our analysis, for example, ignores the possible savings of compliance 
and administrative costs for multinationals. As studies in this field are scarce, this would 
be an interesting topic for future research. Moreover, our study simulates the effects of a 
CCTB on the effective tax burden in Belgium, leaving the consolidation and apportion-
ment out of consideration. However, consolidation would increase the advantages for 
companies as it would introduce automatic cross border loss compensation. Therefore, 
further research in this area would be interesting.
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